China’s Efforts in Civil-Military Integration, Its Impact on the Development of China’s Acquisition System, and Implications for the United States by Cheung, Tai Ming & Hagt, Eric
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2019-04-30
Chinas Efforts in Civil-Military Integration, Its
Impact on the Development of Chinas
Acquisition System, and Implications for the
United States
Cheung, Tai Ming; Hagt, Eric
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63022
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 









Volume I  
Acquisition Research: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change 
May 8–9, 2019 
 
Published: April 30, 2019 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 146 - 
NAVAL Postgraduate School 
China’s Efforts in Civil-Military Integration, Its Impact on 
the Development of China’s Acquisition System, and 
Implications for the United States 
Tai Ming Cheung—School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego 
Eric Hagt—School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University 
Abstract 
China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, is significantly stepping up its efforts to 
pursue civil-military integration—or what he calls military-civil fusion (MCF)—as an integral 
component of its grand development strategy of building a technologically advanced and 
militarily powerful state within the next one to two decades. This paper examines the 
making, nature, and implementation of Xi’s grand MCF undertaking. This paper offers an 
analytical framework that seeks to provide a coherent and holistic view of the many moving 
parts and disparate elements of MCF through an innovation systems perspective. This 
framework identifies seven categories of factors that are important in shaping the structure 
and process of the MCF system: catalytic, input, institutional, organizational, networks, 
contextual, and output factors. Key dynamics that are examined in detail in the paper 
include the high-level leadership engagement, the influence of the external threat and 
technology environments, the application of new financial mechanisms such as hybrid state-
private sector investment funds, the role of key state and military agencies, and the 
evolution of the Chinese defense acquisition system to embrace MCF. 
Introduction 
The defense and civilian economies in China co-exist side-by-side, but their 
relationship has been far from harmonious or close. They are separated by deep-seated 
structural, normative, and operational dynamics that have limited their mutual interactions 
and linkages. This division was originally by design as the Communist state’s founding 
fathers wanted to maintain tight secrecy over defense activities and prioritize the forging of 
the defense industrial base over civilian economic development during the height of the Cold 
War between the 1950s and 1970s. This rigid civil-military compartmentalization became so 
deeply entrenched that succeeding regimes in the post-Mao reform era have struggled 
mightily to bridge this yawning gap—with mixed results.  
From Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s to Xi Jinping today, Chinese leaders have pursued 
an assortment of strategies to straddle the civil-military divide for different reasons. Deng 
sought to divert large segments of the defense industrial base from military to civilian 
production to support broader economic development. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao pursued 
an incremental approach of reducing barriers between the civilian and defense economies 
to promote an expanding overlap of economic activities, such as allowing civilian firms to 
compete for military orders and permitting defense firms to tap into the capital markets.  
Xi Jinping has made civil-military integration (Junmin Yitihua), or what he calls 
military-civil fusion (MCF -Junmin Ronghe), a key element of his grand development 
strategy of establishing a technologically advanced and militarily powerful Chinese state. He 
has replaced the gradualist approach of his immediate predecessors in favor of a far more 
ambitious, high-powered, and expansive strategy that aims to establish a tightly integrated 
dual-use economy during his reign in power. To ensure that his goals and vision are carried 
out, Xi put himself in direct charge of this fusion initiative.  
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To address the title question of whether Xi can build a truly effective and integrated 
civil-military economy, this paper examines the making, nature, and implementation of his 
grand MCF effort. This paper offers an analytical framework that seeks to provide a coherent 
and holistic view of the many moving parts and disparate elements of MCF through an 
innovation systems perspective. This framework identifies seven categories of factors that 
are important in shaping the structure and process of the MCF system. These factors will be 
examined in detail in the rest of the paper. This paper begins though by providing a brief 
overview of the development of MCF policy in China since the beginning of the 21st century 
through to its embrace by Xi Jinping during the first term of his rule in the mid-2010s.  
Defining Chinese Approaches to MCF 
The study of MCF in China is greatly complicated by the lack of clear definition. The 
integration of the military and civilian economies in its broadest definition is an effort to 
remove the longstanding institutional and regulatory barriers between the two systems and 
fuse them into a single entity able to produce for both civilian and military needs. In reality, 
however, the two separate spheres interact in highly disparate ways depending on the local 
political economy conditions in which they are embedded.  
The way MCF is discussed in China can be summarized by grading its related 
activity on a scale of integration, a MCF value chain if you will, which reflects both the 
efficiency and innovation gains in the system through collaboration. At the bottom is a 
complete division between the defense and civilian economies, a condition that has no 
integration in the system, is inefficient and produces little collaborative innovation. Although 
simplified, this was largely the state of affairs in China during the 1960s and 1970s.  
The next level is defense conversion (junzhuanmin), which dominated civil-military 
interaction from the beginning of the reform era (1978) to the late 1990s. With some 
exceptions, this period was marked by a diversion of excess capacity in the defense 
industrial base, precipitated by decreased defense budgets while maintaining the sector’s 
productive force. Integration with the civilian sector was low as this was in the main a one-
way conversion process. While it helped spare the defense industrial base, efficiency and 
technological collaboration were low as the sector competed with the civilian sector in low-
tech, consumable goods.  
Since the defense industry reforms of the late 1990s, a number of additional forms of 
MCF have come to characterize the Chinese economy, including spin off (or military to 
civilian transfer, junzhuanmin) and spin on (civilian to military transfer, minzhuanjun). Spin 
off is the commercial application of a product or technology originally conceived for military 
purposes, while spin on is the reverse: technologies developed entirely within the 
commercial sector and adapted for defense. Both are common in the Chinese economy, 
which can lead to efficiency gains (particularly with relevant commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS] 
products). However, while some interaction is inherent in such spillover economic activity, 
collaboration greatly varies and is often minimal in the Chinese system.  
Dual-use activity (junmin liangyong), on the other hand, particularly the Chinese 
context, implies a closer relationship between the defense and civilian sectors. While some 
degree of dual-use potential is intrinsic to many technologies, this refers to science and 
technology (S&T) programs that intentionally serve both defense and non-defense 
outcomes. This type of program began in earnest with China’s 863 Program in the late 
1980s, but has since been a central component of many national innovation projects 
(Cheung et al., 2016). While the level of civil-military cooperation required for such programs 
is substantial, these dual-use programs are frequently focused on particular technologies 
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and limited in their effect in breaking the barriers of separation between defense and civilian 
participants within these programs, much less the broader economy.  
The next level that has become a leading mantra of defense innovation scholars is 
the so-called mincanjun, or the participation of civilian or commercial entities in defense 
projects. As this domain increases its investment in research and development (R&D) and 
its capacity to lead the defense industry in many emerging technologies, the military is 
looking to encourage their participation in defense projects. Mincanjun clearly has the 
potential to produce a higher form of civil-military interaction and incorporate a much larger 
swath of economic and technological activity for defense purposes.  
And under a final phase, there is a complete fusing of defense and civilian productive 
forces (yitihua, or junmin ronghe), where there are not two separate sectors, but a single 
industrial and technological ecology able to produce for both military and the national 
economy as needed. Such full integration would enable China to achieve maximum 
efficiency and technological innovation gains. While this unified system is more of a long-
term aspiration than an immediate goal, Xi Jinping has emphasized that a fully integrated or 
fused “national strategic system” is his primary policy focus (Jingjing, 2016, pp. 19–20).  
Overview of Chinese Efforts to Pursue MCF in the 21st Century 
MCF has been promoted in China since the early 2000s but with little tangible 
success because of limited leadership engagement, unclear strategy, ineffective 
implementation, and weak civil-military coordination. Despite the weak progress, Chinese 
civilian and military authorities have viewed MCF as essential in the drive for original 
innovation and defense modernization. 
Hu Jintao attempted to broaden MCF’s scope and pushed for deeper implementation 
during his tenure from 2002 to 2012, although with limited success. Ultimately, Hu’s aim to 
implement “overall coordination” stalled due to persistent obstacles such as poor 
coordination among top level decision-making bodies, insufficient regulatory structures to 
allow transfer of technology between civilian and military entities, poor intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection, especially for defense industry-originated IPR, and lack of universal 
industry and technology standards across civilian and military sectors. While Hu’s attempt at 
top-down leadership support should have been enough to catalyze MCF implementation, it 
proved insufficient to mobilize all the needed actors and agencies. 
Two modest successes of Hu’s push were (1) broadening the thinking on MCF away 
from its former limited understanding of “combining the military and civilian sectors” [Junmin 
Jiehe] to an understanding more reflective of the deep implementation required through 
“integration” or “fusion” of civilian and defense sectors; and (2) broadening the scope of 
MCF to include all available economic resources in the promotion of the defense industry, 
including capital, technology, human capital, facilities, and information (Alderman, Crawford, 
Lafferty, & Shraberg, 2014). 
When Xi became China’s supreme leader at the 18th Party Congress in November 
2012, MCF was included in major leadership speeches and policy documents to show that 
the incoming regime would continue to pay attention to this issue. There was though little 
indication of a new direction in MCF policy. The 18th Communist Party Congress work report 
issued in November 2012 detailing Xi Jinping’s policy agenda for his first term pointed out 
that the country would  
continue to follow a Chinese-style path that integrates the development of 
the military and civilian sectors, combine efforts to make the country 
prosperous and the armed forces strong, and strengthen strategic 
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planning, system building as well as related laws and regulations to boost 
the development of military and civilian sectors in an integrated way. 
(Jintao, 2012) 
A year later at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in November 2013 that 
laid out an ambitious roadmap of economic reforms, Xi and his lieutenants offered intriguing 
but vague hints that they were looking to inject new thinking and initiatives on MCF as part 
of the broader goal of undertaking comprehensive reforms of the economy and military 
establishment. The Third Plenum decision noted the importance of  
promoting the extensive development of military civilian fusion. Establish 
mechanisms for unified leadership, coordination between the military and 
localities, linking needs and demands and resource sharing at the national 
level so as to promote the joint development of the army and the people … 
and guiding superior private enterprises to enter into areas of military 
material research, development, production and maintenance. (“Decision 
of the CPC Central Committee,” 2013) 
What stood out were the references to the promotion of “extensive” MCF 
development, creating “mechanisms for unified leadership,” and “guiding superior private 
enterprises” into military activities.  
Xi’s commitment to MCF became evident by 2015, when it was designated as a 
national priority and was consciously incorporated into the innovation driven development 
strategy (IDDS), the country’s new national development strategy, which aimed to develop a 
strategic system and capabilities that will allow China to “implement key science and 
technology projects and race to occupy the strategic high ground for science and technology 
innovation” (“Xi Calls for Deepened Military, 2018). Key elements of this national strategic 
system are detailed in some of the MCF implementation plans that have been formulated 
since the adoption of the MCF development strategy. This includes the 13th 5-Year Special 
Plan for Science and Technology MCF Development issued jointly in 2017 by the Central 
Military Commission Science and Technology Commission (CSTC) and the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MoST) that detailed the establishment of an integrated system to 
conduct basic cutting-edge R&D in artificial intelligence, bio-technology, advanced 
electronics, quantum, advanced energy, advanced manufacturing, future networks, and new 
materials “to capture commanding heights of international competition” (CMC Science and 
Technology Commission and Ministry of Science and Technology, 2017). This plan also 
noted the pursuit of MCF special projects in areas such as remote sensing, marine-related 
technology, advanced manufacturing, biology, and transportation. 
Analytical Framework: The MCF Innovation System 
As a starting point, it is crucial to understand that MCF is arguably one of the most 
ambitious industrial policy programs China has ever embarked on. MCF not only 
incorporates numerous traditional industry sectors (from shipping to aviation), but the 
industry chain of each sector including upstream R&D to downstream manufacturing. In so 
doing, it requires the coordination of an enormous range of bureaucratic stakeholders 
governing the economy. Additionally, there is the divide between the private and state-
owned firms in the economy that must be managed in order for MCF to be effective. As 
much of China’s economy is operated at the local level, a center-local dynamic also plays an 
important role given the national level goals and actors that MCF embodies. This 
decentralized system accentuates the diversity of China’s economy geographically, a 
phenomenon that profoundly impacts a coherent national MCF strategy. If all of this was not 
sufficiently challenging, underlying all of the above is the separation between the military 
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and civilian systems within China that first and foremost must be tackled in order for MCF to 
be conceivable. 
One analytical approach to address this complexity and confusion is to view MCF as 
a hybrid eco-system comprised of institutional arrangements, organizations, networks, 
inputs, outputs, and various other factors. This paper applies the notion of an innovation 
system derived from the systems of innovation and public policy process literature to 
examine the Chinese approach to MCF. Innovation systems are complex, constantly 
evolving eco-systems that include “all important economic, social, political, organizational, 
institutional and other factors that influence the development, diffusion and use of 
innovations” (Edquist & Johnson, 2005). Innovation is of central importance to MCF because 
its mantra is about finding new or improved ways of meeting defense and dual-use needs 
faster, better, and cheaper.  
A diverse array of factors are involved in the MCF innovation process, and the 
framework distinguishes seven categories: 
 Catalytic Factors: Catalysts are the principal motivators of this colossal 
undertaking and are the sparks that ignite innovation of a more disruptive nature. 
These powerful factors are normally external to the MCF innovation system and 
their intervention occurs at the highest and most influential levels of the eco-
system and can produce the conditions for enabling considerable change and 
disruption.  
 Input Factors: These are material, financial, technological, human and other 
forms of contributions that flow into the MCF innovation system. Most of these 
inputs are externally sourced but can also come internally.  
 Institutional Factors: Institutions are rules, norms, routines, established 
practices, laws, and strategies that regulate the relations and interactions 
between actors (individuals and groups) within and outside of the MCF 
innovation system (Edquist & Johnson, 2005, p. 46; Ostrom, 2007, p. 26). Rules 
can be formal (laws, regulations, and standards) or informal (routines, 
established practices, and common habits). Norms are shared prescriptions 
guiding conduct between participants within the system.  
 Organizations and Other Actors: The principal actors within the MCF 
innovation system and main units of analysis of the framework are organizations, 
which are formal structures with an explicit purpose and they are consciously 
created. They include firms, state agencies, universities, research institutes, and 
a diverse array of organized units.  
 Networks and Subsystems: Social, professional, and other types of 
personalistic networks are invaluable means for connecting actors within and 
beyond the MCF innovation system. Networks provide invaluable means of 
sharing information, often more quickly and effectively than traditional channels 
and they help to overcome barriers to innovation such as rigid 
compartmentalization that is a prominent feature of innovation systems (Taylor, 
2016, pp. 157–168). Subsystems are issue or process-specific networks that link 
organizations and other actors with each other to produce outputs and outcomes 
(Weible et al., 2012; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018). Numerous subsystems exist 
within the overall MCF innovation system and they can overlap or be nested with 
each other. The procurement and research and development subsystems are 
two of the most prominent subsystems. 
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 Contextual Factors: This category covers the diverse set of factors that 
influence and shape the overall MCF innovation environment. Contextual 
determinants that exert strong influence include historical legacy, domestic 
political environment, development levels, geographical diversity and a country’s 
size and its markets.  
 Output Factors are responsible for determining the nature of the products and 
processes that come out of the innovation system. They include the production 
process, commercialization, the role of market forces such as marketing and 
sales considerations, and the influence of end-user demand.  
1. Catalytic Factors: High-Level Leadership Engagement and the RMA 
Although MCF has attracted attention and support from Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
between the early 2000s and early 2010s, much of this interest and engagement was 
sporadic and superficial and lacked sufficient political clout and credible commitment to 
overcome the difficult structural obstacles that blocked the path of meaningful progress in 
integrating the civil and defense economies. Xi Jinping’s active and sustained 
interventionalist engagement in MCF affairs since 2015 is having a profound impact in 
reshaping the dynamics and momentum of MCF policy making and implementation.  
Xi’s decisive involvement in MCF can be highlighted by two events. The first was his 
announcement in March 2015 to elevate MCF into a national-level development strategy. 
Prior to this move, MCF was a sector-level industrial policy being managed by mid-level 
government and military officials. Xi’s intervention quickly catalyzed high-level political and 
bureaucratic engagement. In March 2016, the Politburo approved a document titled 
“Opinions on Integrated Development of Economic and National Defense Building” and 
approved MCF as a national strategy (“Consideration of ‘Opinions,’” 2016). These opinions 
formed the basis of the 13th 5-Year Special Plan for Science and Technology Military Civil 
Fusion Development that was issued in 2017 by the CSTC and MOST.  
Another imprimatur of Xi’s high-powered MCF involvement was his willingness to 
become the head of the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian 
Development (CCIMCD) that was created in January 2017 to oversee MCF matters. 
Establishment of the CCIMCD was an unprecedented breakthrough with powerful Party, 
state, and military leaders as members.  
A second important catalytic factor in promoting major development in the MCF 
innovation system is the global threat environment, especially technological threats and 
opportunities. Xi and the Chinese leadership perceive that the world is currently in the midst 
of a profound science and technology revolution in both the military and civilian realms and 
that China needs to be at the forefront of riding this change.  
A focal point of this technological transformation lies in the intersection between 
civilian and military affairs, especially in the information and autonomy domains. These 
technological revolutions occur infrequently and in order to take full advantage of this 
opportunity and leapfrog to the global frontier, the Chinese authorities see the need to have 
a carefully coordinated undertaking between the civilian and military communities in areas 
such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, high-performance computing, advanced 
manufacturing, and robotics. This is being carried out in large-scale industrial and innovation 
initiatives such as the Made in China 2025 Plan and the Science, Technology, and 
Innovation 2030 Major Projects Plan.  
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2. Input Factors: Financial Integration 
Input factors are the basic building blocks in the defense and civilian economies 
needed to advance the goals of MCF. They are tangible “hard innovation capabilities” and 
include advanced research and development facilities, firm-level capabilities in R&D and 
manufacturing, a cadre of experienced scientists and engineers and supporting programs to 
cultivate human talent, technology transfers, sourced domestically or through international 
knowledge markets, as well as the availability of funding and investment sources from state 
and non-state sources (Cheung, 2011). In the case of MCF, it also includes infrastructure 
projects and markets that create civil-military hybrid industrial and technological clusters. 
China has made large investments into building up these tangible inputs and infrastructure 
factors since the turn of the 21st century and this subject has received much analytical 
attention. 
One of the most significant initiatives of the past few years has been the vast new 
sources of funding for the defense industry and MCF projects both through the capital 
markets and government venture funds. Over the past decade or more, the political and 
military leadership has come to grips with financial demands of achieving the goals of its 
expansive military modernization drive (Chaofeng, 2014). In addition, traditional forms of 
state funding—whether from the defense budget, subsidies and loans, or the sector’s own 
profits—perpetuate a high degree of insulation from market forces. Greater opening to the 
capital markets offers the potential both for a large, new source of financing while stimulate 
greater accountability and competitiveness into a closed defense enterprise system. This 
section will focus on this subject area. 
A cursory glance at the state of China’s defense technological and industrial base 
(DTIB) serves as a useful reference point from which to assess the role of financial MCF. 
Measured by revenue and asset-base ($367 billion and $640 billion), the defense industry in 
China in gross terms is a thriving sector.1 Importantly, however, is the rate at which the DTIB 
has grown in the recent past. In the past 10 years, while employee numbers have edged up 
only modestly, its revenue and asset base have ballooned, in several cases well over 150%, 
much more than its western counterparts, and an amount that could more than double again 
in the next five years (“The Frequent Claim,” 2016).  
The size and growth of the Chinese DTIB is in marked contrast to its meager 
performance as measured by profit growth and return on assets. Over the past five years, 
while all major defense enterprises have shown profits, they have been modest (averaging 
RMB 68 billion in the past five years), with some exceptions. More importantly, their average 
year-on-year growth in profits and return on investment (ROA) have been flat (<1% per 
annum since 2015), again with a few exceptions in the aerospace and ordnance sectors, 
while the overall average ROA is a mere 1.7%.2 All in all, the Chinese defense industry, 
while pronounced in size and output, continues to underperform financially and contributes 
                                                
 
 
1 Data for defense industry was collected from various sources (including 
http://www.csindex.com.cn; http://www.fortunechina.com, http://stock.jrj.com.cn) as well as defense 
industry year end reports and websites. 
2 Boeing’s and Airbus’ average rate of profit increase for this timeframe is 19% and 47%, 
respectively, while their average ROAs over the same period have been 5.5% and 2.1%, respectively. 
See http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/node_65.htm and Boeing and Airbus websites.  
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modest profits to its own operations, raising the question of how its large and rapid 
expansion is being funded. 
Naturally, the defense budget, and in particular the procurement budget, is a 
substantial source of income for the defense sector (“China’s Defence Industry,” 2018). 
However, the growth in the defense budget is slowing, reflecting a slowing in the broader 
economy. Financial transfers, subsidies tax breaks and especially low-interest loans have 
been the other sources of support and are certainly significant for state-owned enterprises—
including the defense industry3 (Haley & Haley, 2013, p. 2). While these conventional 
sources of funding are substantial, they do not account for the doubling in size of the 
defense industry during the last 10 years.4 
Instead, the Chinese government has increasingly turned to new forms of financing 
to recapitalize the defense industry. These are closely linked to MCF efforts, because these 
defense monies are being tapped in the commercial and private capital markets. This trend 
was slow to develop until the passage of the mixed ownership reform initiative (MOR) in 
2015 (“Opinions on Promoting Development,” 2015). MOR encouraged the joint equity 
stakes by government and private shareholders in state enterprises, with the dual goal of 
expanding the defense industry’s capital access and exposing the defense enterprises to 
greater market forces and thereby accelerating their reform. Moreover, the latest initiatives 
in defense sector reform have been the restructuring of research institutes, where some of 
the most productive assets lie. In early 2017, a pilot plan to reform 41 research institutes 
was confirmed (“Reform to Classification,” 2017).  
Mixed ownership has manifested in the markets in several important ways. First, 
defense securitization includes over 100 listed companies on China’s primary stock market, 
most of which are majority controlled by the defense industry groups or other state-owned 
entities (“Structure and Design,” 2018). These companies raised an estimated US$63 billion 
between 2010 and 2016 through various market operations (Cheung, 2016). Another form of 
defense industry participation in the market has been the rise in asset-backed securities, 
whereby state-owned non-liquid assets are converted into investment vehicles that can then 
be sold to intermediary financial institutions to be indirectly traded in primary and secondary 
capital markets (Yuwa, 2007).  
The overall asset securitization rate of China’s defense industry currently stands at 
an average of 33%. With a current total defense industry asset base of RMB 4.15 trillion 
($638 billion), there is the potential to tap an additional several trillion RMB in the market as 
the defense industry opens up (“At a Rate of Only 30%,” 2017). If the higher predictions of 
20% annual growth in the defense industry overall for the next 5–10 years is realized, these 
astronomical figures may not be unwarranted, though many barriers remain to its 
implementation.  
Another financial phenomenon that will profoundly impact the future of MCF 
implementation in China is the tidal wave of government guidance funds (GGFs) that has 
emerged on the scene in the last three to four years (Liang, 2018). GGFs are part of a 
                                                
 
 
3 One estimate put the amount of subsidies to SOEs at US$310 billion (~2 trillion RMB) from 
1985–2005 (nominal terms). 
4 Between 2009 and 2018, asset value has gone from roughly RMB2 trillion to over RMB4 
trillion, and revenue has gone from RMB1.4 trillion to RMB2.4 trillion.  
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broader state-directed industrial policy to channel national resources into its goals under its 
2016 “Innovation-Driven Development Strategy” (Ministry of Science and Technology, 
2016). These efforts consciously link defense and civilian production and R&D capabilities to 
achieve its goals. Moreover, among the now thousands of GGFs that exist, explicit MCF 
projects have risen as an important portfolio of many local government sponsored GGFs. 
To summarize the financial landscape of MCF, these new channels of funding in the 
form of securitization and government guidance funds are significant both in their scale, and 
in their nature. They represent in aggregate the opportunity for massive financial 
recapitalization of China’s DTIB, but they are being tapped with limited effect on the 
restructuring and opening up of the defense enterprises to the civilian participation. In fact, 
the evidence suggests their monopoly position and political status have risen in the past few 
years. The nature of a state-led investment approach poses inherent contradictions for an 
MCF economic model that seeks a genuine participation of the civilian private and 
commercial sectors with the defense sector. 
3. Institutional Factors: Formal and Informal  
The role of institutions is of central importance to innovation systems. Broadly 
defined, institutions are the norms, routines, habits, established practices, and other rules of 
the game that exist to guide the workings of the system and the interactions between 
organizations (North, 1990, pp. 4–5). These come in formal (such as development 
strategies, laws, and standards) and informal (conventional routines, market incentives, 
governance norms) variants. The notion of institutions is particularly salient for China’s MCF 
program because of the interplay of so many actors across industrial sectors, state and 
market entities, central and local governments, and civilian and military agencies. 
Understanding the nature of interactions amongst this panoply of organizations is critical 
because creating an effective institutional arrangement to achieve this has been one of the 
most intractable challenges for the Chinese leadership in its pursuit of MCF goal of fostering 
an innovative and collaborative ecosystem.  
Under the Hu administration, efforts to promote MCF focused primarily on reforms to 
defense corporations and on establishing a body of regulations, policies, standards, and 
other mechanisms by which to encourage the flow of private-sector technology, talent, and 
investment into defense projects. The work done in building up these institutions is 
voluminous (Wenxian et al., 2015).5 In essence, this pre-Xi period laid the formal institutional 
foundations for MCF. What this phase failed to accomplish however, as pointed out earlier, 
was to fundamentally alter established social, organizational, and cultural patterns of 
interaction and norms of behavior (Xie & Lu, 2014). In other words, the informal institutions 
relevant to MCF have proven far more difficult to change. A lack of leadership engagement 
and an overarching strategy led to ad hoc, structurally misaligned initiatives (Lafferty, 2019). 
From an institutional perspective, Xi altered the MCF landscape in several important 
ways. First of all, a raft of new high-level strategies, plans and other administrative 
arrangements have been developed following 2015 Xi’s decision to elevate MCF to a 
                                                
 
 
5 One compendium of these efforts details over 300 major regulations, standards, and 
planning documents, covering a wide range of procurement, intellectual property rights protection, 
and other provisions issued by a host of agencies including GAD, the CMC, the State Council, the 
NDRC, SASTIND.  
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national strategy that collectively represent a committed effort to reform the defense S&T 
industrial base and shift behavioral norms and practices. They build on previous ideas but 
are much more specific in the sectors and actors involved, and call for closer collaboration 
between civilian and defense sectors working in these fields (“Xi Jinping Presided,” 2017). 
Unlike previous institutionalization of MCF, these documents are issued by a superior 
authority (“Bluebook on Prospects,” 2019).  
A second way in which Xi is altering the institutional environment is by integrating 
MCF initiatives with the larger innovation-driven development strategy and many of the 
major national S&T programs associated with it. By linking strategic plans and initiatives 
together, and funding resources along with it, the interaction between organizations involved 
in these pockets of innovation is moving toward a freer, more fluid collaboration and 
exchange of ideas. This is most apparent in cutting-edge technology fields with strong 
government support, but it is occurring spontaneously in technology centers around the 
country, indicating a shift in normative behavior or informal institution building (Hagt, 2019). 
Similarly, through his high-tempo and wide-ranging production of laws and opinions, 
Xi Jinping is not just ramping up a set of formal institutions but he is also sending a strong 
political signal of commitment to a MCF agenda. This catalytic factor in China’s MCF 
ecosystem is impacting the relationship of other factors, as the innovation literature predicts 
(Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Xi’s support for MCF is coordinated with resource allocations, 
which is altering the interaction of organizations and changing mindsets and conventional 
practices.6 The gradual rise in enthusiasm for experimenting with MCF projects at the local 
level is an example of this phenomenon. Also, the publication of product catalogues and 
technology patents also show changes in conventional practices.  
4. Organizational Factors 
Organizations and other actors in the civilian and defense economies are central 
factors in the MCF innovation system. They are the vehicles for technological change in that 
they carry through and facilitate innovations (Edquist & Johnson, 2005). Collectively, 
organizations refer to entities that are directly or indirectly involved in supporting a MCF 
economy, ranging from private and defense corporations, to government agencies, military 
entities, and the research and development system, but can also be key individuals in the 
policy decision-making process. Creating a MCF ecosystem, which calls for an additional set 
of actors and institutions, has been difficult given the complexity of managing a much 
broader group of players and interests in China’s political economy (Cheung, Mahnken, & 
Ross, 2018).7 This section will focus on one of the critical elements catalyzing China’s 
current MCF innovation eco-system: the CCIMCD.  
The creation of the CCIMCD in 2017 under Xi’s leadership was an unprecedented 
move and is the highest such organization in Chinese history to oversee MCF related work 
(General Staff Department Compilation Group, 1991, p. 567). This Party institution was 
necessary not only to bring together the various civilian stakeholders within the economy, 
but also to bridge the two major parts of the Chinese system: the State Council, China’s 
                                                
 
 
6 For instance, officers from CEDD, AMS, and NDU emphasize that past MCF-related efforts 
were frequently resisted by local if not aligned with its interests, but sustained political attention 
mitigates that over time. Interviews in Beijing, 2017. 
7 These authors distinguish between defense and military innovation. 
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supreme executive body overseeing the civilian national economy, and the Central Military 
Commission, China’s leading military institution. Policy practitioners of the civil-military 
economy in China have long bemoaned the lack of such a supra-organization (Chuanxin, 
2014). Without it, coordination of these two systems of equal rank in China’s body politic in 
the pursuit of a complex undertaking like MCF is doomed to bureaucratic inertia, as previous 
efforts had demonstrated.8  
The CCIMCD is populated with around two dozen senior Party, state, and military 
leaders. Its importance is best represented by the fact that the body has already convened 
four meetings, issuing important policy guidance on MCF initiatives with increasingly more 
specific measures to implement MCF across the country (Guangrong, n.d.). The CCIMCD is 
also distinctive in that the military has substantial representation in this body with five 
members (members and vice-chairman of the CMC)9 (“Han Zheng Chairs National 
Symposium,” 2018). This is a significant point given that MCF is an initiative that involves 
the civilian economy, a domain traditionally (and constitutionally) off limits to the military.10  
Civilian Actors 
The State Council, a supra-agency with chief administrative authority in China, holds 
a number of departments and ministries responsible for MCF. Two agencies are most 
relevant in this respect: the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense 
(SASTIND). The NDRC is a core department of the State Council with wide-ranging powers 
over major national development projects and their funding. Within this commission is the 
Department of Economic and Defense Coordination, which is the body most focused on 
macro-level economic planning involving the defense and non-defense sectors, with 
particular purview over national economic mobilization. With the NDRC’s prominent role 
over economic planning, it also takes a lead role in MCF activity and is a principal in 
convening meetings.  
SASTIND is a relatively lower ranked body, but it is the only agency charged with 
directly regulating the defense enterprises.11 It is an agency under the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology (MIIT), the large bureaucracy with a purview over industrial 
planning and regulation. On the surface, this makes for a rational organizational framework, 
bringing defense and non-defense sectors under one administrative roof.  
A number of other bureaucracies have a degree of input with respect to MCF 
implementation, including MoST, which plays a central role in the country’s vast national 
S&T program—including the planning of S&T parks—much of which has dual-use 
applications. The State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
and its local branches manage and own state enterprises, including the defense sector. In 
                                                
 
 
8 In general, previous MCF efforts were ad hoc, structurally misaligned, of low policy priority. 
See Chao (2016).  
9 Previously Zhang Gaoli and currently Han Zheng.  
10 This point was made by NDRC officials. Interview BJ27-8. 
11 SASTIND has control over a substantial pot of money (estimated at RMB 100 billion over 
10 year period, granted sometime in the mid-2000s), but interviewed sources generally admit that 
SASTIND is relatively weak and without this funding, would have little influence over the defense 
enterprises. Interviews in Beijing, 2015. 
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general, their responsibility is to ensure returns on investment of SOEs, but they also have 
some input in performance evaluation of state-owned sector leaders. The Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) is also involved with evaluating and funding development projects and 
supporting industry parks across the country. The State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) is 
in charge of patents, intellectual property, and technology transfer in China and works with 
the CMC to declassify defense patents.12  
Military Actors 
The structure of leadership over MCF activity on the military side also involves a 
number of high-level bodies. The agency formally charged with leading this effort is the 
CMC Office of Strategic Planning (COSP). Originally a third-level organization subordinate 
to the General Staff Department, the COSP was elevated to one of the 15 departments 
directly under the CMC under the 2015 reforms, and is responsible for the overall 
configuration of defense resources and the PLA’s modernization goals, particularly in 
science and technological innovation. An important task under this bailiwick is civil-military 
integration, and the department houses the MCF Bureau to manage the military’s efforts and 
is the principal contact with State Council departments working on MCF.  
Two other sources of expertise with regard to MCF reside in the PLA. One of these is 
the CMC Equipment Development Department (CEDD), responsible for procurement, 
acquisition, and defense R&D. CEDD was formerly a powerful general department, housing 
substantial expertise in managing defense projects, and had the closest relationship with the 
defense industry sector (Hagt, 2014). It has traditionally been the principal advocate for 
MCF in the military and supports the MCF Bureau. Another important player in MCF on the 
military side is the CSTC, a body also promoted in status under the 2015 reforms, reflecting 
the importance placed on S&T for military innovation. This institution also holds substantial 
expertise through its traditional relationship with military research institutes in the defense 
industrial base. The CSTC works with MoST to identify dual-use and MCF collaboration in 
key national S&T projects, the product of which was a recently published S&T MCF 
development plan (Tao, 2017).  
Other departments involved more peripherally in MCF include the CMC Joint Staff 
Department (CJSD), which is in charge of operations and overall command and control of 
the armed forces (“The Battlefield Environmental,” 2016; “The First Geology MCF,” 2016). 
Also the Strategic Support Force, responsible for space, cyber, and electronic warfare, has 
built ties outside the military, signing cooperation agreements with research universities and 
software development companies (Laskai, 2018). The National Defense Mobilization 
Department—another body carved out of the former GSD and placed directly under the 
CMC—is significant in that defense mobilization planning dovetails with MCF efforts in a 
number of ways, such as the collaboration of transportation and communication 
infrastructure development projects to meet both civilian and military needs. In this respect, 
this organization works with its State Council counterpart to coordinate defense mobilization 
requirements. But it is also significant for its charge over the Provincial Military Commands 
(PMC) (“16 Provincial-Level,” 2018). In short, this branch is the PLA’s most direct interface 
with local (provincial governor) leaders on matters relevant to MCF (Li, 2014). The most 
                                                
 
 
12 SIPO works with the CMC National Defense Intellectual Property Office, and in early 2017, 
over 3,000 declassified defense patents were released at www.weain.mil.cn. Also, see Nouwens and 
Legarda (2018). 
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recent organizational addition to MCF relevant efforts under the CMC is the founding of the 
Military Science Research Steering Committee (MSRSC), an agency launched in early 2017 
that is modeled on U.S. DARPA (Ni, 2017). Its specific mission is as yet unclear but will 
likely be to identify priority areas for investing R&D resources in both defense and civilian 
sectors and thereby help guide national security development plans.  
There are several distinctive features of China’s organizational approach to guiding 
its MCF strategy that point up both strengths and weaknesses in its design. With this new 
institution, the Party leadership has finally resolved a longstanding barrier to joint planning of 
the defense and civilian components of national economy and S&T innovation system. 
Second, the formation of a permanent commission, rather than an ad hoc leading group, 
sends a strong political signal about the top leadership’s vision to pursue a long-term 
strategy of MCF.  
It has led to a proliferation of institutions and planning initiatives at many levels of 
government.13 The administrative and functional lines, and their status and authority in 
decision-making are unclear. In the State Council, for instance, the relationship between 
SASTIND and the MCF Promotion Bureau—both formally under MIIT—is ambiguous. The 
effectiveness of the NDRC and its subordinate National Mobilization office to coordinate with 
other offices is also problematic. On the military side, the MCF Bureau has little specific 
expertise and must rely on assistance from the CEDD and the CSTC, where relevant 
competence traditionally was housed. The addition of yet another body to guide R&D efforts 
in the military sphere, the MSRSC raises questions about its distinctive role in MCF, in 
relation to the MCF Bureau or the CSTC, both of which also have responsibilities over 
military R&D efforts (Grevatt, 2017). In short, the uptick in political commitment to MCF and 
the rise in organizations dedicated to this effort will help empower its implementation, but it 
will also increase bureaucratic bargaining, as China’s system has frequently proven in the 
past (Lieberthal & Lampton, 1992; Mertha, 2008; Dougan, 2002).  
A second feature evident in the organizational architecture is the limited role of the 
MCF strategy’s foremost proponent, the military. While the PLA is substantially represented 
in the CCIMCD, it has virtually no footprint at the local level. This was not always the case. 
The PMC (sheng jun qu), through its role in national defense mobilization and procurement 
responsibilities for military region forces, had the potential to serve in some capacity as a 
useful local platform for certain types of MCF activity (“Following Reform,” 2016; Li, 2014). 
However, the PMC’s purview over local mobilization and army building was curtailed under 
the 2015 reforms, effectively constraining the potential of this regional civil-military entity as 
a platform for MCF. At local level, the military essentially has no direct formal representation 
to interact with government departments in charge of economic and industrial affairs and 
therefore has little authority or means to promote a MCF agenda with local development 
planning.  
A third distinguishing feature here is the central role of the state-owned enterprises in 
China’s defense industrial system. The 11 major defense firms control and operate the 
majority of China’s defense sector research, development, and production. Despite ongoing 
reforms to transform their historically closed-off nature—through MOR reforms—the defense 
                                                
 
 
13 This discussion of continued bureaucratic chaos comes mainly from interviews with officials 
in 2017 and 2018 (Hagt, 2019). 
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industries have so far remained resistant to fundamental change (“90% of Defense 
Enterprises,” 2018). Moreover, their dominant position in the defense political economy 
arena of China’s system means that they will be instrumental in the outcome of an 
integrated national development plan that the MCF strategy envisions (Lafferty et al., 2013). 
However, there is effectively no direct authority or control over defense industry enterprise 
operations, and real power over them lies within the Communist Party. Since the CCIMCD 
has not yet been replicated at lower levels of the political system, there is a large power 
differential between the defense enterprises and the much lower ranking local governments 
in which they reside, making comprehensive planning needed for MCF difficult to achieve. 
5. Networks and Subsystems  
Traditional and formal organizations and institutions, many of which are described in 
this paper, heavily dominate China’s MCF infrastructure. In fact, the formation of 
government bodies and the crafting of laws, regulations and planning guidelines are a 
particular strength of China’s state-centric model of industrial policy making. However, as 
the literature makes clear, networks and subsystems are the “interstitial connectors” that link 
actors and processes in the innovation ecosystem and are crucial to mitigating 
compartmentalization and enhancing information sharing and technology diffusion (Taylor, 
2016, pp. 157–168). Until recently, there has been an absence of such platforms in China’s 
MCF system, a product of its statist approach, and exacerbated by issues such as secrecy, 
historical legacy, and unclear IPRs and the monopolistic behavior of its defense firms. 
However, that is changing, and an exciting new development in China’s MCF efforts is the 
emergence of a range of novel mechanisms that are enabling these crucial linkages in the 
system. 
Subsystem: CMI Acquisition System 
One of the most prominent of these is the formation of what amounts to a new CMI-
specific acquisition regime that is in part a reform of, but is also separate from, the existing 
monopoly-oriented system. The PLA and the State Council have instituted many 
components to this new acquisition platform that allow for private sector firms to be vetted 
and approved for defense work, that facilitate a more open bidding process and generally 
enhance transparency of the acquisition governance regime.  
Some of the elements of this new system include web-based portals that are 
appearing both at the national and local levels. The much-heralded PLA’s Weapons 
Acquisition Information Network (WEAIN), launched in 2015, provides information on the 
country’s weapons and armament needs, relevant policies, procurement notices. Moreover, 
the PLA has vetted 13 intermediary tendering agencies to screen applicants and manage 
the bidding process (“The Military’s Weapons,” 2018). As of early 2018, it had attracted over 
16,000 registered entities and listed more than 4,500 technology procurement notices 
(Yang, 2018). Moreover, the site also holds over 3,000 defense patents that were 
declassified in 2017 as part of an effort to increase transparency and encourage the private 
sector to engage defense research and production (Nouwens & Legarda, 2018). Many local 
governments and S&T parks have founded similar online platforms.  
As of October 2017, the PLA, in conjunction with SASTIND, officially announced the 
streamlining of the arcane defense contractor approval process, making it substantially 
easier for smaller commercial firms to obtain the necessary licenses and approvals 
(“Mincanjun,” 2017). Extensive catalogues of products, technologies, and firms for 
researching, developing, and manufacturing military weapons and equipment were released 
by SASTIND. 
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Within the last year, a number of reforms to the tax system, the pricing of military 
products and technologies and standards have made substantive progress, all of which are 
paving the way for greater private participation in the defense acquisition system. 
Commercial enterprises can now enjoy many of the tax incentives previously restricted to 
defense firms (lower VAT and “return first policy”).14 The fixed pricing system (cost-plus) that 
dominated earlier eras has given way to more flexibility and includes a range of negotiable 
pricing schemes for a much larger portion of defense products and technologies (Xi & 
Bingwei, 2018).  
The PLA has also increased its efforts to sidestep the traditional acquisition system, 
particularly with regard to accessing the private and commercial domains for high-end and 
emerging technologies. The newly empowered CSTC now has greater control over the early 
phases of the R&D process—for example, experimental and exploratory research—whereas 
this was overseen by the General Armaments Department prior to 2015 reforms. The 
previously mentioned Military Science Research Steering Committee also serves to better 
identify emerging technologies for military application in the private domain. The creation of 
the National Defense S&T Innovation Rapid Response Team under the CSTC, located in 
Shenzhen, is the most recent move. This is very similar to the DIUx offices in the United 
States and forms another part of this new system to enhance technology acquisition in the 
commercial sphere. 
Networks: Non-Traditional Platforms 
There are also novel ways in which China is generating cross-linkages in the system. 
First, exhibitions where civilian and military enterprises gather to show off technologies and 
exchange information have proliferated. The Zhuhai Airshow is the most visible of these, but 
virtually every major S&T center convenes these events to demonstrate new dual-use 
projects and burgeoning MCF areas as well as facilitate a two-way channel of 
communication between private and defense enterprises. SASTIND has been the leading 
agency in holding exhibitions, but the PLA has also shown increasing interest in directly 
participating (“Private Enterprise,” 2014).  
The designation of national MCF demonstration bases has also been a prominent 
strategy to foster interaction between defense and civilian activities. As of mid-2018, there 
were 36 such bases in 22 provinces and cities around the country (Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, 2018). These are important because underlying this strategy is the 
notion that spatial proximity is key to technology diffusion. Industry clustering fosters a 
higher degree of interconnectedness that encourages spillover in technology and 
knowledge—between defense and commercial firms—thus stimulating productivity and 
innovation (Jolly & Zhu, 2012).  
One of the most novel developments in China’s MCF economy is the intermediary 
entities that are on the rise in many local governments. These range from government to 
quasi- and even non-government institutions, which provide an array of liaison, research, 
and consulting services to facilitate information exchange and interactions between civilian 
and defense actors in the local economy. Such organizations are especially active in thriving 
economic centers where industrial and technological complementarity with the resident 
                                                
 
 
14 Interviews in Chongqing, May 2016. For discussion on tax reform, see 
http://pg.jrj.com.cn/acc/Res/CN_RES/INDUS/2019/3/6/4e258c51-a0d9-4eff-9517-7455fc98a073.pdf  
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defense industry is higher. These intermediaries are unique in that they either have experts 
in-house that have defense industry backgrounds, or their staff includes retired military 
officers familiar with defense procurement and acquisition practices.15  
In sum, these various platforms that are making their debut in the past few years 
largely fall outside the conventional actors and institutions of the MCF system. Yet, they 
constitute a vital enabler for MCF implementation in local economies where the threshold for 
the majority of commercial and private enterprises is too high to engage in defense work 
(Huixian, 2017). They provide the connections between the notoriously separate defense 
and civilian parts of the economy. These emerging entities are helping generate the bottom 
up collaboration that will be essential if MCF is to succeed.  
6. Contextual Factors: MCF Implementation 
This category comprises a set of conditions that shape the environment in which 
MCF happens. In this sense, they are usually broader in scope than other factors (such as 
inputs and formal organizations) and cover political, institutional, and even ideational 
aspects of an innovation system (Abramovitz, 1986). Using the framework of contextual 
factors is especially useful when examining China’s MCF efforts at local levels, where much 
of the implementation occurs. The complexity of China in terms of geographical diversity, 
levels of development, governance structures and historical legacies dictate that MCF will 
be carried out with a high degree of variance in form and substance. And the aggregate of 
these contextual factors help understand the specific operating environment of MCF and the 
different outcomes that it leads to.  
The set of conditions that impact MCF implementation can be summarized under 
several overarching variables, which, while not comprehensive, aid in deriving general 
models and are important indicators of their relative success (Hagt, 2019). The first is what 
may be called complementarity between the local economic and political context and the 
resident defense entity. In order for collaboration between the defense and commercial 
sectors to occur, a local economy must be sufficiently competent (in either industrial or 
technological aspects) in providing what the defense sector requires; or vice versa, for the 
defense sector to integrate with the local economy, it must be able to produce goods and 
technologies the commercial sector demands.  
A second variable that is unique to China’s system is the role of center-local 
relations. The objectives of a national MCF strategy are not always aligned with local 
development priorities and properly structuring incentives for civil-military collaboration is 
almost without exception a difficult center-local exercise. The center-local dynamic is also 
manifested in other ways. China’s political system is sensitive to rank and status within the 
party and government structures. This hierarchy of power and position comes to be an 
important factor for MCF implementation because the defense industrial enterprises, as 
central, monopolistic institutions with immense influence at the political Center, are difficult 
to manage by local officials who are much lower in status.  
A final variable affecting MCF implementation is the notion of governance. In general 
terms, this is the local government’s ability to mobilize and effectively utilize its natural, 
financial, economic and political resources to pursue a policy agenda—in this case, MCF. In 
other words, how well a local government can parlay its particular economic and industrial 
                                                
 
 
15 Interviews in Shenzhen and Beijing, 2016–2017. 
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strengths into effective implementation of MCF has an important governance dimension. 
These variables interact dynamically across the national landscape and shape the 
implementation of MCF in myriad ways. This complexity at the national level does not lend 
itself easily to gross assessments; however, there are three relatively coherent models of a 
MCF economy that can be identified.  
7. Output Factors: Measuring Implementation 
Output in the context of defense innovation and the systems innovation literature is 
broken down into a number of archetypes, ranging from simple copying at the one end to 
sophisticated disruptive innovation at the other (Cheung et al., 2018). The notion of output 
for a MCF economy must differ to an extent because one is not just looking at technological 
innovations, but the level of collaboration and integration between the civilian and defense 
sectors that generated the output. In other words, the relational dimension of the civil-
military axis is decisive.   
There are many forms of civil-military activity conducted around the country that fall 
under the larger rubric of MCF. If conceptualized along a continuum, higher value types of 
MCF reflect closer collaboration and lead to greater efficiency and innovation gains in the 
system but they also become more challenging politically as an increasing array of 
organizations and institutions become involved. These extend from simple defense 
conversion with little or no integration on the one extreme to organic fusion of defense and 
civilian economies on the other. The current state of MCF is the widening participation of the 
commercial and private sector in the defense economy (mincanjun), though primarily lower 
(3rd and 4th tier) component supply in addition to discrete, or stand-alone technologies.16 
Quantifying MCF along this value chain is a direct way to measure output of a MCF 
innovation system.  
The problem in measuring MCF output based on this formulation is a paucity of data. 
A second difficulty is the lack of specificity in documenting the nature of MCF conducted. 
This is partly for a lack of commonly held standards when reporting MCF s, but many local 
governments and agencies that benefit from “MCF output” are also incentivized to 
exaggerate results. Many cities and provinces use crude methods of calculating “MCF 
degree,” which are devoid of significance in both qualitative and quantitative terms (“Speech 
by Luo Qiang, Mianyang Party Secretary and Cao Zhiheng,” 2014).  
That is not to say that all data published by the government are meaningless. Many 
government and military agencies provide some quantification, but these are usually top-line 
figures. For instance, one report states that two-thirds of enterprises approved to do defense 
work are civilian and a third of those are private firms. The PLA reported recently that by the 
end of 2017, almost 10,000 firms and over 700 high-tech firms had “entered the ranks of 
national defense and military construction” (Maorong, 2019). These headline numbers are 
impressive on the one hand, but they represent a miniscule percentage of their respective 
totals. These figures quantify civilian participation in the defense sector (mincanjun) in the 
most macro sense, but there is no discussion of quality, such as information that would help 
                                                
 
 
16 To date, expos around the country have typically showcased discrete technologies—
though increasingly impressive—to sell as stand-alone systems, such as robots, 3D printing, energy 
storage systems, electronics, navigation equipment and software, cyber security system, high-
performance materials, and drones (UAVs). See Guoli (2018). 
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one gauge an enterprise’s engagement with the defense sector—R&D, production, design, 
subsystems, or component off the shelf sales.  
Other, indirect quantitative methods of measuring output are also possible (Jaffe et 
al., 1993). One proxy for civil-military integration is technology diffusion. Joint patent activity 
and joint science and technology paper publications between these actors are frequently 
utilized to study collaboration in Beijing’s innovation economy. Other ways of examining 
knowledge flow and technology diffusion include the use of patent citation analysis. 
Although much of the registered patented technology falls into the dual-use realm, all of 
these methods are imperfect yardsticks, as much of the data is not specifically defense 
oriented, or subject to selection bias (Nouwens & Legarda, 2018).  
A more fruitful approach to measuring MCF progress and impact is qualitative in 
nature and borrows from the U.S. defense industry concept of the lead system integrator 
(LSI) (Gansler et al., 2009). Viewing MCF’s success through this lens highlights the 
importance of many of the factors discussed in the systems innovation framework. A 
Chinese LSI from the private, corporate sector would represent a disruptive innovation at the 
institutional, political, bureaucratic, and economic level. Given the powerful position of the 
defense conglomerates, discussed earlier, the presence of an outside system integrator 
would clearly indicate a high level of political support by the leadership. Moreover, LSI would 
demonstrate genuine change in the monopolistic position of the defense enterprises and a 
more effective institutional and governance regime to implement collaboration.  
A range of fields in high-tech, disruptive technologies where China is seeking to 
become globally competitive is receiving increasing analytical attention (Ray et al., 2016; 
Kania, 2017; Katwala, 2018; Fisher, 2010; Sinko, 2017; Krekel, Adams, & Bakos, 2012). 
These range from robotics, to artificial intelligence, quantum computing, aerospace, 
nanotechnology, new materials, drones, high performance computing, and others. In many 
of these, the private corporate sector is beginning to engage seriously in MCF through 
technology contribution, co-licensing, and partnerships in R&D (“Baidu Establishes,” 2017). 
It is clear the military and defense sectors are able to leverage significant amount of 
technology and know-how from these projects. What is less understood is the degree to 
which firms are actively participating in these MCF projects or acting as system integrators. 
Government R&D institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and defense 
enterprises, such as China Electronics Technology Group, continue to play central roles. 
Beyond these specialized technology programs, with their high-level government attention 
and funding, private enterprises’ role in defense programs is limited to lower tier component 
supply. Measuring the level of participation would require deeper corporate profiling. 
Implications for the United States  
A central goal of China’s MCF strategy is to develop and acquire weapons “better, 
cheaper, faster.” The trajectory of that effort will have far-reaching consequences for the 
United States’ ability to manage the military balance with China. The defense industrial 
complex itself has since the turn of the century greatly improved in its own ability to produce 
more advanced weaponry. Moreover, state-directed and funded institutions, especially 
Academies of Science and Engineering, national labs, and defense universities, and to a 
lesser extent civilian universities, represent an important civilian body of capabilities that 
have certainly helped transform China’s research, development, and acquisition system. But 
all the available evidence strongly suggests this has come at a high cost. In aggregate, this 
state-led defense and civilian sectors capture enormous amounts of national resources, but 
these are highly inefficient (Liu, Simon, Sun, & Cao, 2011; “Interpret ‘Made in China 2025,’” 
2015). In short, the system has become better and faster, but not necessarily cheaper. The 
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fact that MCF has been elevated to a national strategy with a sense of urgency precisely at 
a period when China is making huge strides in its military modernization suggests the 
leadership views a fix to the inefficiency of the system as essential to sustain this trajectory. 
However, the goal to fix this—facilitate the participation of China’s robust private or 
commercial economy in defense building—has only begun to achieve results, and its 
prospects for successful implementation remain highly uncertain despite its high level 
attention at the Center. Private and commercial sector engagement in defense acquisition 
and procurement programs remains limited largely to 3rd and 4th tier component production. 
The emergence of a genuinely private or commercial entity that acts as lead system 
integrator for a major defense program would demonstrate deeper reform of the system. 
That has not yet happened, as the defense enterprises remain largely resistant to 
fundamental change.  
Another important goal of MCF is financial integration. Asset securitization and the 
ability to tap financial markets represent an important turning point for the defense industrial 
base. Access to the market is allowing for a massive recapitalization of the defense industry. 
A much larger windfall of capital in the years ahead could well materialize as SOE reform 
moves forward. The expansion of the defense sector in the last decade attests to this 
increased capture of national resources through the market. This financial aspect of MCF is 
significant because it falls outside conventional understanding of the resources devoted to 
China’s defense industrial base. It is not a well-understood phenomenon, in large part due to 
the opaque nature of China’s statist market and the complexity of SOE reform. But it is 
certain to be an important factor in China’s military modernization drive. Military procurement 
budgets, preferential tax treatment, subsidies and loans—all of which are slowing in 
growth—may not be the biggest determinants of the defense industry. Assessments of 
China’s military modernization trajectory based principally on budgetary and extra-budgetary 
state largesse misses this new source of funding that will grow in size and importance over 
time.  
Ironically, this aspect of financial integration stands in contrast to the previously 
discussed MCF goal of increasing innovation and efficiency of defense work through private 
and commercial sector participation. Ideally, SOE reform and asset securitization is meant to 
diversify ownership in order to infuse better corporate management and governance, not 
just increase resources. However, despite the substantial securitization of defense assets, 
the group corporations remain completely state-controlled, and even its listed subsidiaries 
are in the main still government owned. In other words, the financial markets are being 
leveraged to recapitalize the defense sector with little impact on their political or monopoly 
position in the economy—and in fact may be helping to further consolidate it (Milhaupt & 
Zheng, 2016). The implications here are that military modernization may continue apace 
despite the lack of progress in MCF in terms of commercial participation. The rise of 
government industry guidance funds, an equal and possibly larger source of capital, may 
only accentuate this trend.  
While the narrower definition of MCF has direct implications for the state of China’s 
defense industrial base, there is also a broader conceptual goal for the national MCF plan 
that has profound implications for U.S. national security and its economic relations with 
China. IDDS explicitly formulates an agenda that closely links defense building with nation 
building, blurring the lines between defense and civilian domains (Levesque & Stokes, 
2016). Strategic industries and dual-use technologies are targeted for development with the 
aim of transforming China into a world-class power in economic, technological, and military 
terms. This mobilization of national resources to achieve economic-hard power makes China 
a techno-security state. This has obvious and direct implications for America’s own defense 
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industrial base, but even more troubling are the indirect, less discernible risks to U.S. 
defense and economic superiority. 
The broader challenge for the United States regarding China’s MCF strategy is two-
fold. The first is the nature of many emerging technologies and industries from a dual-use 
standpoint, some of which have direct and clear defense applications—such as robotics and 
semiconductors—but many others that have potential for or are foundational to defense 
purposes that are frequently more remote from or are embedded in a long component 
defense industrial supply chain—specialized machine tools, artificial intelligence, and 
biotech are examples here. Moreover, most of these technologies have vast commercial 
potential, which means they are available to anyone and their development is widespread, 
making their monitoring for national security purposes a highly complex undertaking. The 
second and interrelated challenge stems from China’s own well-defined industrial strategy 
linking defense and civilian economic goals, and which directly influences both outbound 
and inbound FDI. This intrinsically dual-use development plan entails the targeting of 
technologies and industries much farther upstream and downstream in the supply chain—
both defense and commercial—than would normally be the case (Humphries, 2015, pp. 4–6; 
Bureau of Industry and Security, 2016, p. 3; Interagency Task Force, 2018). Similarly, the 
risks to technologies and components in the defense industrial supply chain become more 
widely spread and so much harder to map (Brown & Singh, 2018). Taken together with the 
variety of financing vehicles (acquisitions, mergers, but also minority stake ownership) that 
are employed by Chinese investors, monitoring is extremely difficult.  
To date, the tools used by the U.S. government and Department of Defense are 
limited, though they have improved recently with the increased attention to Chinese 
investment behavior in the United States. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. 
(CFIUS) is one of the few mechanisms in place today with real power to govern inbound 
investments with potential national security threat (Jackson, 2018). While originally a blunt 
tool that only reviewed relevant transactions that resulted in a foreign controlling interest, 
CFIUS’ jurisdiction has recently been expanded under the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to cover non-controlling foreign interests in critical 
infrastructure, critical technologies, or sensitive personal data, including via indirect 
investment and if a foreign government is involved.17 Importantly, however, a radical move to 
include U.S. outbound investments to China with potential national security implications was 
removed from the final FIRRMA reforms (Donnan, 2018).  
Perhaps the most important lesson for the challenge that China’s MCF strategy 
poses for the United States has to do with political will. China’s strong, centralized, state-led 
system allows for a substantial degree of engineering of industrial and economic goals. 
Such a state-centric design in industrial policy is unfamiliar to the U.S. free-market system. 
Even control over broad technology in the United States is highly controversial within the 
commercial technology community, where the largest markets for many foundational and 
emerging technologies are non-defense in nature. Despite the reforms to CFIUS or other 
tech transfer measures, several major recent studies argue that the United States remains 
                                                
 
 
17 FIRRMA takes the “direct” out of foreign investment review. Therefore other investment 
types (assets purchased from bankruptcies, or the presence of Limited Partners in a VC fund) can 
now trigger CFIUS action. Also, filings involving foreign governments are mandatory. See Croley et 
al. (2018) and Oleynik et al. (2018). 
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vulnerable to loss of critical technologies. It is unclear how the U.S. polity could muster the 
political will to take a whole of government approach and institute a comprehensive policy 
tool set necessary to protect against the depth and breadth of the challenge: from supply 
chain vulnerabilities, to targeted investments for tech transfer and industrial espionage. Yet, 
bold action may be the only means to meet the challenge of protecting U.S. military 
technological advantage.  
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